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Abstract 
The economic crisis, the outsourcing of production, and 
globalization have produced significant changes in industrial 
relations and trade unions. Because of these changes, dissent – 
which is usually manifested through the exercise of the right to 
strike and the spontaneous actions – faces certain limitations set 
by trade union clauses, which have been recently introduced to 
govern industrial relations (e.g. industrial peace clauses and 
enforceability ones). In order to deal with the foregoing questions, 
the present paper provides an analysis of the notion of strike 
through supranational sources (Introduction, Silvia Donà, 
Università di Roma La Sapienza), followed by an examination of 
what is meant by “holding the right to strike” in Italy. The paper 
goes on to investigate the way this right is exercised (Section 1, 
Lilli Carollo, Università di Roma La Sapienza) and the clauses which 
have been devised to narrow down its exercise through the years 
(Section 2, Anna Rota, Università di Bologna), and concludes with 
an overview of the consequences arising from the violations of 
these clauses (Section 3, Marianna Russo, Università di Roma La 
Sapienza). With a view of better understanding the peculiarities of 
the Italian rules concerning the right to strike, a comparison will be 
provided with France and the UK (Marta Filippi, Università di Roma 
La Sapienza).  
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Introductory Remarks. 
Freedom of association has been carefully considered by 
International Law through ILO Conventions No. 87 and 981 concerning 
“freedom of association” and “the right to organize and collective 
bargaining”, respectively.  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights – which was transposed into Italian law through Act No. 881 of 25 
October 1977, also argued in favour of the acknowledgment of the right 
to strike. In a similar vein, Article 11 of the 1950 Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CEDU) – which 
was ratified and implemented in Italy by means of Act No. 848 of 4 
August 1955 – guarantees the right to form trade unions. The freedom to 
organize is also ensured by the European Social Charter, which also 
safeguards workers’ right to bargain collectively and to protect 
themselves, including the right to strike.  
The international legal sources referred to above place an 
obligation upon governments to transpose these provisions into national 
legislation, and a number of monitoring mechanisms are in place that can 
be enforced by both individual citizens and associations to ensure 
compliance. Nevertheless, one of the main challenges is the effective 
implementation of these rights.  
EU legislation also recognizes the right to strike as a fundamental 
one, particularly following the enforcement of the Nice Charter. Moving 
beyond certain resistance from the previous EU treaties, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union formally acknowledges the 
right to strike, even though silence is maintained on “the modalities trade 
unions should be legitimized at the European level”2 (Galantino, 2009, 
82). Specifically, Article 28 of the Nice Charter, which was given legally 
binding value following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 
December 2009, established that “Workers and employers, or their 
respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and 
national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective 
agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, 
to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action”. 
Concerning social fundamental rights, one might note that the 
European Union draws a distinction between those matters falling within 
the remit of the Community that are dealt with by means of directives 
and those which are considered to be outside EU competence, among 
                                                            
1 These Conventions have been ratified in Italy by means of Act No. 367 of 23 March 1958. 
2  Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is under the obligation to 
adhere to the ECHR, pursuant to par. 2, Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union.  
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others: remuneration, the right to organize and, significantly, the right to 
strike and lockout (Giugni, updated version by Bellardi, Curzio, Leccese, 
2014, 260 and ff.). In the latter case, while regarding the right to 
collective action as a fundamental one, the EU leaves to each Member 
State the task of regulating these aspects.  
The landmark decisions in the Viking3 and Laval4 cases are 
illustrative of this approach and provide an example of the restrictions 
that can be placed on the right to collective action in order to comply with 
EU law (Carabelli, 2009, 143). 
In this connection, Article 28 of the Nice Charter mentioned above 
plays a key role in that, because  it achieves a balance between the 
exercise of the right to strike and the fundamental economic freedom 
ensured by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
This is because the exercise of the right to strike cannot justify 
violations of EU law, even when they are acknowledged in national 
legislation. The decisions in the Viking and Laval cases drew criticism 
from legal opinion (Ballestrero, 2008,371; Sciarra, 2009,27-33), for they 
appear to significantly limit the right to collective action to prioritise 
freedom of establishment (as it is in Viking) or freedom to provide 
services (as in Laval). A further criticism concerns the competence of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to set such major restrictions on the right 
to strike (Carabelli, 2009, 143) and the advisability to involve it in 
matters which are the exclusive responsibility of Member States, as 
specified in the TFEU. 
The analysis of the industrial relations system at an international 
and community level indicates that many questions exist that are 
relatively difficult to solve: the balance of competing interests, complex 
and subtle issues associated with competence and responsibilities and the 
difficulty arising from the effective implementation of rights, as is the 
case with the right to strike.   
Considering the Italian case, par. 1, Article 39 of the Italian 
Constitution sets forth that “The organization of trade union is free”, 
while Article 40 specifies that “The right to strike is exercised within the 
laws that regulate it”. As early as in the years following the enactment of 
the Constitution, legal opinion (Calamandrei, 1952, 221) pointed out the 
need to set conditions and limitations to the right to strike which, in the 
absence of specific provisions, should be established by case law drawing 
                                                            
3 Cf. C. Giust., 11.12.2007, C-438/05, International Transport Workers' Federation, Finnish 
Seamen's Union c. Viking Line ABP, OÜ Viking Line Eesti.  
4 See C. Giust, 18.12.2007, C-345/05,Laval un Partneri Ltd c. 
SvenskaByggnadsarbetareförbundet, SvenskaByggnadsarbetareförbundetsavd. 1, 
Byggettan, SvenskaElektrikerförbundet. 
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on Article 40 of the Italian Constitution. This assumption is still relevant 
today, since the regulation of such a delicate matter as the right to strike 
is closely related to the enforceability of collective agreements, a point 
which has been made by many authors recently (Maresca, 2015, 112 
ss.). 
Prior to the enforcement of Act No. 146 of 12 June 1990, 
lawmakers did not make any attempt to regulate the right to strike, and 
a number of restrictions were introduced by case law. By way of example, 
Ruling No. 711/1980 of the Corte di Cassazione (the Italian Supreme 
Court) provides some guidance on how to distinguish between “external” 
and “internal” limitations of the right to strike. The external limitations 
have been established to associate recognition of the right to strike with 
other rights established by the Constitution in an attempt to achieve a 
balance between competing interests. As for the internal limitations, they 
are intended to classify unusual forms of strikes, making use of notions 
based on pre-determined elements, since not all manifestations of conflict 
can be seen as legitimate ones.    
A part of legal literature considered taking strike action as an 
individual right that the government should ensure; (so-called diritti 
soggettivi pubblici) thus, neither national legislation nor the employer can 
impede its exercise (CALAMANDREI, 1952, 221). In this sense, Article 40 
of the Constitution should be seen as related to the principle of 
“substantive” equality (par. 2 of ex article 3 of the Constitution) in 
consideration of the societal clash resulting from the competing parties 
(employers and employees). However, this view seems to diverge from 
the previous one according to which the right to strike is a worker’s 
“potestative” right (Ghezzi, 1963, 84). In other words, right holders 
(workers) are given the means to safeguard their interests (e.g. a strike). 
Legal literature has always considered the question concerning the 
identification of the right holder and the ways this right can be exercised 
(Bellocchi, 1994, 169). Many theories developed as to whether a right is 
granted individually, collectively or even “jointly”, with the latter based 
on the German legal system (NOGLER, 2013, 12). Each of these views 
has prevailed over the years – depending on the period and the industrial 
relations system in place – and the debate is still ongoing today. 
Therefore, it is interesting to refer to research on who the holder of the 
right to strike is (F. Santoro Passarelli, 1949, 138 ff.; Tosi, 1989, 71 ff; 
Pino, 2005, 112 ff.; A. Zoppoli, 2006, 1ff.; Carinci, 2009, 424 ff.; Romei, 
2012, 336-337; Borgogelli, 2014, 171ff; Lambertucci, 2015, 66 ff). The 
most widespread approach seems to be the one that considers the right 
to strike as collective, and more emphasis is given to whether this 
entitlement is exercised effectively.  
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1. The Right to Strike: From Holding to Exercising it. 
With a view to distinguish between holding and exercising the 
right to strike, it seems useful to examine the meaning of the terms 
making up the notion of a “strike” to see how this right is exercised: 
right/entitlement; proclamation/exercise; abstention/exercise. 
The right to strike encloses all these elements and doubtless is “a 
complex social phenomenon of both an individual and a collective nature” 
(Rusciano, 2002, 172).  
As seen, Article 40 of the Italian Constitution determines that “the 
right to strike is exercised within the laws that regulate it”. Act No. 146 of 
19905 is a special provision which regulates the way this right should be 
exercised, limiting the freedom of the parties to ensure that other 
constitutional rights are safeguarded and to protect all the values that 
come into play.  
Legal literature considered the distinction between the right to 
strike in essential public services and in other sectors (ROMEI, 1999, 221 
ff; PILATI, 2004), although in the context of this paper a general 
overview of these aspects will be given by only pointing out a few major 
differences between the two forms of strike action. The puzzling 
formulation of Article 40 of the Constitution paves the way for new and 
different interpretations on the holder and of the way this right is 
exercised, with this latter point being more complex. 
“Holding a right” refers to the relationship between a legal and 
individual status and the holder, who is “the reference entity of this right 
and its qualifying components which connect through his/her presence”; 
the word “holder” is used to refer to both someone who exercises a right 
and benefits from it (ZATTI, 1994. In relation to strike action, see ROMEI, 
2012, 334). 
Exercising is concerned with the practical implementation of a 
right. In the event of a strike, it implies the interruption of the 
employment relationship, while ensuring other workers’ rights (e.g. trade 
union rights and those not related to one’s work performance)6. The 
exercise of the right to strike is not legally permitted and does not comply 
with the conditions established in Article 40 of the Italian Constitution 
when it is detrimental to business productivity; that is when it hampers 
an employer’s freedom of economic initiative as regulated by Article 41 of 
the Italian Constitution (Ruling of the Corte di Cassazione No. 711 of 30 
January 1980). However, many questions arise concerning the holder of 
                                                            
5 See Act 12 june 1990, n. 146, «Norme sull'esercizio del diritto di sciopero nei servizi 
pubblici essenziali» (G.U. 14 june 1990, n. 137). 
6 Cass. sez. lav., 30 october 1995, n. 11352. 
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this right. This is because in dealing with the right to strike, two legal 
dimensions must be considered: on the one hand, there are trade unions 
or any other collective bodies; on the other hand, there is the worker who 
decides to join the strike, and, therefore, to effectively exercise his/her 
right not to work (SANTONI, 1999, 19).  
The wording “holding a right individually, but exercising it 
collectively” (SIMI, 1956, 125; MENGONI, 1961, 37; GIUGNI, 2010, 237) 
means that exercising such a right is “intended to promote no-individual 
interests”(BELLOCCHI, 1994; ROMEI, 1999, 247). 
In this sense, besides the terms making up the wording of the 
Constitution, it is decisive to take due account of the underlying collective 
interest which concerns one’s professional status7, (F. SANTORO 
PASSARELLI, 1949, 12). Specifically: “the right to strike is concerned 
with collective action” undertaken to claim one’s right, better working 
conditions, and new forms of collective bargaining (BALLESTRERO - DE 
SIMONE, 2012, 306). Consequently, exercising the right to strike and not 
going to work is functional to this interest (ROMEI, 2012, 335)8. 
Other authoritative scholars supported the thesis that the right to 
strike is either a right that individuals hold collectively, but exercise 
individually (PINO, 2005; ZANGARI,1976, 50) or a collective one (PERA, 
1989, 699). Hence, a further distinction is made between the strikes 
resulting from the right to form trade unions and spontaneous strike 
action, which is initiated by a body or a group in times of labour conflict 
(BELLOCCHI, 2013, 326; M.G. GAROFALO-U. ROMAGNOLI, 1988, 581). 
At any rate, whoever the holder of the right, industrial action must be 
agreed upon collectively.  
Two more competing theories exist which concern the exercise of 
the right to strike. The proclamation theory argues that an individual 
exercises his/her right to take industrial action following the decision 
made collectively (ZANGARI, 1976, 52), whereas the implementation 
theory supports the view that the decision to take industrial action is a 
collective one and therefore already complies with the types of strike 
action legally permitted, irrespective of the fact they are agreed upon by 
the collective (SIMI, 1956, 112; PERA, 1989, 699). 
In reference to the exercise of the right to strike, Italian system 
makes a distinction between the moment a strike is called – which 
involves a group of workers, trade unions or organizations at the grass-
                                                            
7 See Trib. Firenze 31 october 1989, TLG, 1989, 695.  
8 Corte Cost. 28-12-1962, n. 123, in MGL, 1962, 416; Corte Cost. 14-1-1974, n. 1, in MGL, 
1974, 11; Cass. 17-12-2004, n. 23552, in GL, 2005, n. 9, 53. 
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roots level – and that when workers stop working, which concerns 
workers exclusively.  
Accordingly, while the prevailing view is that going on strike is “an 
individual right which is exercised collectively” (SIMI, 1956, 125), the fact 
that workers are the holders of this right is representative of a collective 
interest (GIUGNI, updated version by BELLARDI, CURZIO, LECCESE 
2014, 263). Not going to work and exercising this right is a worker’s 
choice, provided that this choice is agreed upon (or reunié(e) as French 
judges would say). The fact that it is the individual worker who holds the 
right to stop working is confirmed by the definition of a strike as one’s 
decision “not to perform work as laid down in the employment contract” 
(SIMI, 1956, 24). In this sense, joining a strike is a right which can be 
exercised by workers, irrespective of their affiliation with trade unions or 
other bodies, thus treating all workers equal (BALLESTRERO, 2012, 380). 
According to many, ambiguity arises when exercising the right to 
industrial action, since strikes are declared and take place in two different 
moments. Calling a strike does not mean that an agreement has been 
reached between workers who decide not to go to work. Rather, it can be 
seen as an invitation to join the strike (GIUGNI, updated version by 
BELLARDI, CURZIO, LECCESE 2014, 266), as effective agreement to take 
industrial action is reached only “when workers effectively and collectively 
stop going to work”. The latter represents the exact moment a strike 
occurs9. 
Therefore, trade unions, or other groups established 
spontaneously to represent workers, have the task of pinpointing the 
collective interest and “guiding” individual workers while exercising their 
rights. However, they are not entitled to this right10 and no-strike 
agreements are binding only for the signatories, not for individual 
workers (See sections 2 and 3). In other words, the announcement is a 
formal procedure which is not essential to a strike11. According to most 
scholars, exercising the right to strike does not require an announcement 
on the part of trade unions (BALLESTRERO – DE SIMONE, 2012, 309). 
Consequently, calling a strike is “a voluntary act that is not subject to any 
special requirement and through which those concerned decide to 
disseminate the news of such action to meet certain collective interests” 
(A. ZOPPOLI, 2006, 153). Calling a strike means to “spread the word 
concerning industrial action” and “to make people aware of who 
organized it”, although it is frequently the case that “no declaration takes 
                                                            
9 Cass. Sez. lav., 8 august 1990, n. 8021, Trib. Roma, 2 june 1987. 
10 Trib. Siena 27 october 2008, in RGL, 2009, II, 877. 
11 Cass. 17 december 2004, n. 23552, in DRI, 2005, 506; Trib. Roma 27 november 2007, in 
LG, 2008, 827. 
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place, and, when it does, it is not formalized so as to allow the 
identification of those who called it” (A. ZOPPOLI, 2008, 670; PASCUCCI, 
2008, 12). Groups other than trade unions can call a strike and 
encourage individual workers to exert their right, leaving them free to 
decide to join the protest or to go to work (ROMEI, 2012, 334). As far as 
the exercise and the announcement of a strike are concerned, emphasis 
should be given to the practical implementation of one’s right to industrial 
action.  
A distinction should be made between the moment the strike is 
called collectively – the official announcement, i.e. when information is 
given about the way this right should be exercised (LUDOVICO, 2014, §6) 
– and when this right is exercised individually, in compliance with Article 
40 of the Constitution and Act No. 146 of 1990. Essential public services 
have been regulated by means of special provisions. Legal  literature has 
observed that the new procedures to call a strike as amended by Act No. 
146/1990 have generated a new interpretation of legislation concerning 
the right to strike, which now sees it as a collective rather than as an 
individual entitlement (RUSCIANO, 2002, 2). Both the rights to join and 
announce a strike and those to exercise it and not to go to work are 
limited through measures preventing conflict12.  
The same does not happen in other areas where these aspects are 
usually governed by case law. The collective nature of industrial action 
emerges when the strike occurs, as collective bodies with a sufficient 
power of representation voice the interests of a category or a group of 
workers (SIMI, 1956). Others argue that the collective dimension of a 
strike already manifests when the latter is announced (F. SANTORO 
PASSARELLI, 1949), supporting the view that emphasis should be given 
to the collective interest over the scope for workers to decide not to 
perform their duties. This aspect can be explained by the fact that the 
decision of an individual worker not to perform his/her tasks to pursue as 
collective interest is itself regarded as a form of strike13. Yet the reverse 
is also true: the case of a group of workers who do not go to work to 
fulfill personal, albeit unrelated, interests falls within the definition of a 
strike14. 
However, as argued earlier, strikes can also be called by entities 
other than trade unions. In fact, this right can also be exercised by 
workers who are not trade union members and even by those whose view 
is not in line with that of trade unions, like for instance grassroots 
                                                            
12 See the conciliation procedures implemented before calling a strike, art. 2, Act n. 
146/1990. 
13 Pret. Castelnuovo Garfagnana 9 june 1971, GC, 1971, I, 1882. 
14 Cass., sez. lav., 23 july 1991, n. 8234. 
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organizations (GIUGNI, updated version of the volume by BELLARDI, 
CURZIO, LECCESE 2014, 263)15. Accordingly, calling a strike does not 
require a formal announcement or notice, save for those cases laid down 
in self-regulation codes. 
Finally, since the right to strike is an individual entitlement aimed 
at safeguarding a collective interest, exercising this right requires that 
workers who totally or partially suspend their working activity should 
made this decision collectively, irrespective of their decision to take part 
in the strike16.  
To this end, Italian legislation allows for the right to organize 
meetings (Article 20 of Act No. 300/1970) and referenda (Article 21 of 
Act No. 300/1970), through which trade unions and other organizations 
can ensure workers’ consensus.  
The considerations on holding and exercising the right to strike 
lead one to reflect on the conventional limits and the sanctions laid down 
by trade union rules if workers decide not to perform their duties, also 
when not going to work is a collective decision and takes place 
spontaneously. This peculiar form of strike action is often referred to as 
“wild strike”. 
As seen, any group of workers driven by individual reasons can 
generate a collective interest and become a legal entity and, as such, a 
holder of this right. They can spontaneously decide not to perform their 
duties, with this act that is an uncontrolled, unscheduled and unorganized 
manifestation of the will of autonomous groups.  
Spontaneous strikes still represent a critical issue in Italian 
system, particularly when assessing their legitimacy at the time of their 
announcement and considering “hypothetical” sanctions (MAGNANI, 
2005, 79; FERRARI, 2006, 86). This is especially true in relation to 
essential public services, since Act No. 146/1990 has been seen as a form 
of “collective means to channel conflict” (IORIO, 2005, 176). 
The most important amendments on this issue are included in 
Resolution No 05/518 of 16 October 2008 of the Official Committee on 
Strikes. This provision states that in the event of a series of spontaneous 
and collective strikes from which no elements emerge to identify the 
organisers (MONTUSCHI, 2003 e 2005), an inquiry into the workers 
involved would not result in the application of the penalties laid down in 
Act 146/1990 and ff. Rather, this move should be viewed as an invitation 
to the employer to sanction those held responsible for allegedly illegal 
strikes. 
                                                            
15 Cons. Stato, sez. IV, 12 october 2000, n. 5414. 
16 Cass , sez. lav., 08 august 1987, n. 6831. 
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As pointed out in the case of spontaneous strikes, subjectivity and 
collective aspects cannot be taken into account and the only question that 
should be answered is whether trade unions can take steps to regulate 
the actions of dissenters. Further, a relation should be established 
between this type of strikes and the legal procedures, the sanctions and 
the new rules contained in the 2014 Consolidated Text, taking into 
account the aspects concerning the distinction between the “exercise-
announcement” and the “exercise-adhesion” moments (Section 3). 
To sum up, while no problems arise in relation to the procedures 
to call a strike, some questions emerge concerning the sanctioning 
mechanism and the implications that failing to sanction spontaneous 
strikes might have on third parties. When the social partners try to 
regulate and harmonise competing interests – thus limiting one’s right to 
strike – the recourse to spontaneous strikes is likely to increase, precisely 
because they are neither regulated nor limited through a conflict-
management system. 
2. From Industrial-peace clauses to the 
“enforceability” of collective agreements. 
The revived interest on who has to be regarded as the holder of 
the right to strike has been accompanied by a lively debate on collective 
conflict due to a major review of the national industrial relations system 
(TREU, 2013, 597; ROMEO, 2011, 464-465; GRAGNOLI, 2013, 658 and 
ff.) and of the role of trade unions. Besides being involved in law-making 
on working conditions (ROMAGNOLI, 2013, 7), unions are also tasked 
with ensuring that collective dynamics do not affect the presence of 
businesses in the labour market (ROMEO, 2013, 467; CARRIERI, 2011, 
25 and ff.; MARESCA, 2014, 564). This function of collective bargaining, 
which is mainly the result of the new economic context and globalization 
(Lassandari, 2005, 266 and ff.) can be found in the recent agreements 
concluded by the social partners (LASSANDARI, 2013, esp. 253 and ff.), 
which are intended to prioritise the adequate economic planning of 
production.  
Against this changing background, conflict is governed through 
clauses of industrial peace negotiated at different levels in collective 
bargaining.  
An analysis of the most recent collective agreements might help to 
become familiar with the main features of a never-ending debate among 
industrial relations scholars, which particularly concerns the relationship 
between the enforceability of the contract and the right to strike 
(Mengoni, 1975, 253 was the first who considered the enforceability of 
the collective agreement in Italy. A more recent evaluation of this topic is 
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provided by GHERA, 2012, 243 and ff.; LAMBERTUCCI, 2015b, 72 and 
ff.).  
Before providing a detailed analysis of this issue, it might be 
useful to draw a distinction among absolute, relative and procedural 
clauses of industrial peace. Absolute clauses are those through which 
conflict is prevented. Theses clauses cannot be included in the collective 
agreement since it unlawfully limits the right to take industrial action. 
Conversely, relative and procedural clauses are legally permitted. Briefly, 
relative clauses limit the exercise to the right to strike in definite issues, 
whereas procedural clauses involve the use of arbitration and conciliation 
practices to resolve conflict.  
It should also be noted that the prevailing view that the right to 
strike is an individual one have led lawmakers to acknowledge that 
industrial peace clauses apply to collective entities but not to individual 
workers (for a summary of the doctrinal debate, after GHEZZI, 1967, 149 
and ff., see PASCUCCI, 1990, 493 and ff. and more recently, P. 
LAMBERTUCCI, 2015b, 72 and ff.) since the latter cannot waive or amend 
their right to strike. Consequently, industrial peace clauses have been 
included among the mandatory terms of collective agreements, while the 
worker’s possible misconduct has been considered only in the relationship 
between trade unions and workers17.   
A different outcome would have allowed to regard one’s right to 
strike as a collective one, since the clauses of industrial peace could have 
applied to both workers and the signatory trade unions. No changes have 
been reported in relation to the debate concerning the exercise of the 
right to strike. It is worth recalling that in a very few cases, scholars have 
argued that these clauses imply that trade unions and their members 
waive their right to strike, particularly if one considers union 
representation (F. SANTORO PASSARELLI, 1971, 375 and ff.; PERA, 
1964, 927 and ff.). 
Significantly, the current discussion on the role and the definition 
of industrial peace clauses is also influenced by the thesis put forward by 
legal literature. The view that the right to strike is collective has been 
given fresh momentum, encouraging many scholars to question the 
weakness of the mandatory section of the collective agreement in Italian 
unionism (TREU 2007, 658; DE LUCA TAMAJO, 2011, 364; CORAZZA, 
2012, 126, who discuss the presumed backwardness of these measures if 
                                                            
17 It must be pointed out that the only pronunciation of Cassation on the point considered 
the terms of ceasefire binding on workers, valuing the bond of employee representation by 
the union policyholder and function and conciliatory settlement of the collective agreement. 
In these terms Cass. 10/2/1971, no. 357. This is a thesis partially taken from LISO- 
CORAZZA, 2015, 6.  
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compared with the negotiation practices in place in the UK, Spain and 
Switzerland).  
One might note that industrial peace clauses were in force as early 
as the 1960s. This aspect was evidenced in collective bargaining, 
according to which these and so-called postponement clauses are 
mutually related. Specifically, industrial peace clauses were intended to 
safeguard the assignment of competences in the collective agreements 
concluded at a higher level. This was followed by a period of permanent 
conflict (GIUGNI, 1970, 34 and ff.) where industrial peace clauses lost 
their relevance and were only seen as standard clauses. Following this 
period when employment contracts were not viewed as tools to deal with 
labour conflict, a new scenario emerged where industrial peace clauses 
were intended to manage conflict in exchange for an obligation on the 
part of trade unions to provide workers with information concerning their 
rights (CORAZZA, 2014).  
Noting that unregulated collective conflict represents a luxury that 
many economic systems can still afford (DEL PUNTA, 2012, 50; ICHINO, 
2006, 16 and 223), the most recent industrial peace clauses differ greatly 
from the “commitment schemes” foreseen by the Giugni Protocol, for at 
least two reasons.  
The 1993 Protocol made provision for industrial peace clauses 
lasting up to the conclusion of the collective agreement, envisaging 
sanctions for workers, who were no longer paid during the collective 
shortcoming. Following the Separate Agreement of 22 January 2009 
(RICCI, 2009, 367; F. CARINCI, 2009, 177 and ff.; CORAZZA, 2012 
amplius), collective agreements prioritized conciliation and arbitration 
procedures over the power to waive or suspend one’s right to industrial 
action.  
Especially since the conclusion of the Interconfederal Agreement of 
28 June 2011, the parties agreed to establish and regulate an industrial 
relations system that favoured competitiveness and productivity to boost 
production, employment levels and remuneration (TREU, 2011, 616).  
The implementation of measures to avoid conflict is illustrated by 
the common willingness to conclude and make use of industrial peace 
clause, as a normal and necessary tool to guarantee the stability of 
collective bargaining binding for the trade unions and the employers’ 
associations which signed the 2011 Interconfederal Agreement, by virtue 
of which the collective agreements concluded at a company level become 
enforceable.  
Unlike the past, the most recent collective agreements are devoid 
of a repressive approach towards conflict, since there are no sanctions for 
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those engaged in conflict-management if failing to fulfil their duties is the 
result of compliance with the contractual terms (MASTINU, 2013, 381). 
An exception to this state of affairs are the collective agreement 
concluded in the plant of a leading car manufacturer (he last of which 
was signed in the month of July 2015) where conflict is regulated by 
assigning more responsibility to trade unions than in the past (ROMEI, 
2012, 572; MASTINU, 2013, 382; BAVARO, 2015, 302-303).  Besides 
committing not to use industrial action as a tool to amend collective 
agreements prior to their expiration, now trade unions also face 
responsibility (MARIUCCI, 2011, 500; F. CARINCI, 2010, 598; TERZI, 
2011, 18) if workers engage in protests which trade unions are unable to 
stop and which seriously endanger the continuation of the business 
activity (CHIECO, 2011, 365; S. LIEBMAN, 2011, 1284).  
Although its peculiar nature in company level collective bargaining, 
this clause is lawful, since the effects of the negotiations of industrial 
peace do not concern the worker’s prerogatives, but the powers of trade 
unions on an exclusive basis (DE LUCA TAMAJO, 2010, 1087).   
The last time when collective bargaining considered these clauses 
was on 10 January 2014, that is when the Consolidated Text on 
Representation was enacted. It was stated that “The signatory parties of 
recent collective agreements commit themselves to establish penalties to 
sanction any act or omission impeding the enforceability of the national 
collective agreements concluded pursuant to the present provision. This 
will be done with a view of laying down measures to prevent and sanction 
actions compromising the negotiation process, as established by 
Interconfederal Agreements, and the enforceability and effectiveness of 
the collective agreements concluded in compliance with the principles and 
the procedures referred to in the above provision”.  
The wording of the Consolidated Text on Representation confirms 
the decision to assign liability to the trade unions which sign or adhere to 
interconfederal agreements, by laying down industrial peace clauses in 
the collective agreements concluded at the company level and solving the 
issues of the effectiveness of and compliance with these terms. In other 
words, industrial peace clauses are not assigned legal value so that 
workers face no direct liability if they breach a “peace obligation”. This 
aspect points to the need to make the collective agreement enforceable – 
as indicated by the foregoing company level collective agreements, the 
Interconfederal Agreement of 28 June 2011 and the Agreement signed on 
31 May 2013. It also calls for the need to lay down special sanctions for 
any violation resulting from non-compliance with the terms of the 
collective agreement (about some example of penalties for non-
compliance should be noted LAMBERTUCCI, 2015, 95-96). The notion of 
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“enforceability” (about its significance, recently FALSONE, 2015, 123 and 
ff.) is used to provide protection against strikes and other forms of 
industrial action that endanger the performance of the contract, therefore 
safeguarding the interests stemming from the implementation of the 
latter (MARESCA, 2014, 570).  
In conclusion, the most recent experiences show that the renewed 
purpose of the collective agreement is that of ensuring compliance with 
contractual duties without affecting its performance. This need for 
certainty can be seen in the terms regulating the binding industrial peace 
clauses of the collective agreements concluded at national or a company 
level, which extend the effectiveness of the latter to all the parties 
concerned. In company level collective agreements this aspect is evident 
in clause 6 of the Interconfederal Agreement of 28 June 2011 and in 
clause 5, part IV of the Consolidated Text of January 2014. As for 
national collective agreements, one can have a look at clause 5, part II of 
the Agreement of May 2013 and clauses 2 to 4, part IV of the 
Consolidated Text.  
Unlike the past, the introduction of industrial peace clauses in the 
collective agreement is not to be intended as a standard clause 
(CORAZZA, 2012, 55), but as a tool to ensure compliance with the 
commitments undertaken by the parties to the collective agreement (see 
DE LUCA TAMAJO, 2010, 798; contra BARBIERI, 2014, 578). In other 
terms, what emerges in the most recent collective agreements is the 
willingness to effectively regulate conflict and to help businesses stay in 
the labour market through a stronger and new commitment of the 
signatory trade unions. This is even truer if one considers the role they 
can play to avoid the outsourcing of production (see CORAZZA, 2011, 
374).  
3. Enforceability and Sanctions. 
In order to gain an understanding of the novelties introduced by 
part IV of the 2014 Consolidated Text (CORAZZA, 2014, 1), it should be 
highlighted that more relevance is given to the consequences of non-
compliance with  contractual system than in the previous agreements. 
Specifically, the 2011 Interconfederal Agreement and the 2013 
Memorandum of Understanding devoted only one and two clauses to this 
aspect, respectively, while five paragraphs covered this issue in the 2014 
Consolidated Text. Furthermore, “the need to lay down provisions to 
prevent and sanction” any violations of contractual rules is highlighted for 
the first time. A further confirmation of the need to regulate conflict is 
also evident in linguistic terms, due to the frequency of expressions like 
“to sanction”, “penalties” and “sanctioning mechanisms”.  
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This could be seen as symptomatic of a transformation of the 
industrial relations system (VALENTE, 2014, 454). Many politic, social and 
economic factors exist which affect the dynamics of trade unions and 
encourage social actors to move beyond an adversarial approach: strikes, 
workers’ traditional protection tools, are less widespread than in the past 
(CORAZZA, 2012, 13; G. SANTORO-PASSARELLI, 2013, 416); trade 
union density is decreasing among workers and employers (CELLA, 2002, 
118 and ff.; LANZALACO, 1998, 147); the fact that collective bargaining 
is increasingly carried out at the company level, along with the 
internationalisation of production, have inevitable implications on 
industrial relations systems; the threat of delocalisation, especially in 
times of crisis, acts as a deterrent to trade union claims; the recent 
political instability and the lack of rules on union representation seem to 
encourage self-regulation among the social partners.  
This complex framework includes the commitment of the 
signatories of the 2014 Consolidated Text to fully implement what has 
been agreed upon, by resorting to negotiation to deal with conflict. The 
social partners acknowledge the need to devise tools to prevent and 
tackle possible conflict while concurrently providing sanctions for those 
who violate and invalidate the contractual terms (MARESCA, 2015, 111 
ff.). In this respect, a break with the past can be seen in that trade 
unions show their reliability and capability to represent by avoiding 
conflict, rather than spurring it (CORAZZA, 2012, 13; DEL PUNTA, 2012, 
31; LISO, 2013, 837). This calls for the need to ensure compliance with 
contractual clauses by establishing a sanctioning system in the event of a 
violation of such clauses.  
The generic nature and the enforceability of industrial peace 
clauses do not allow to provide a clear definition of “a breach of the 
contract”. In the 2014 Consolidated Text, a contractual breach is defined 
as “any type of action intended to jeopardize the negotiation process”. 
This is a wide definition and includes a number of approaches. Breaching 
a contract does not only mean to call a strike while the collective 
agreement is still in force, nor does it necessarily refer to illicit conduct, 
but to any action which might compromise what has been decided upon 
in the agreement (MARESCA, 2015, 111 ff.).  
It should also be pointed out that the 2014 Consolidated Text 
makes reference to any act or omission, without making any distinction. 
Therefore, trade unions not only commit themselves not to call a strike, 
but also to make sure the collective agreement is complied with, by 
exerting their influence on member associations at a local level and on 
workers, be they individuals or organised in collective bodies.  
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An interesting aspect concerns the identification of those who can 
be held liable and can be sanctioned in the event of a breach of the 
collective agreement. Unlike Act 146/90 (and following amendments) 
concerning essential public services, the 2014 Consolidated Text does not 
allow sanctions to apply to individual workers. This distinction has 
reasonable grounds, because it is legislation and not the collective 
agreement that is taken as a source of regulation. In addition, the 
peculiar nature of public essential services ensures that users, who are 
regarded as third parties within the employment contract, enjoy the 
rights laid down by the Italian Constitution.   
The 2014 Consolidated Text keeps silent about the case of groups 
of workers who call a spontaneous strike. On this score, we agree on the 
position of the European Committee of Social Rights, which argues that 
industrial peace clauses  “only apply to the members of the signatory 
trade unions and not to other workers, whether or not unionised” 
(European Committee of Social Rights, 2005, 40).  
As things stand now, and without considering the complexity to 
identify the members of spontaneous groups, it is difficult to admit the 
possibility of sanctioning groups of workers who call a strike 
spontaneously and thus violate industrial peace clauses. This is because 
the 2014 Consolidated Text chose not to act on the relationship between 
individuals, but to strengthen the links between trade unions. Such an 
approach is evident if one looks at the frequency of the wording “the 
signatory parties” in the text and is realized through the provision of 
sanctions within the collective agreement itself, which ensures that trade 
unions fulfil the duties they have undertaken (F. CARINCI, 2014, 67).  
For the reasons explained above, it seems more appropriate to 
talk of “enforceability clauses” than of “industrial peace clauses”, as is 
traditionally the case. Significantly, making enforceability dependent on 
the relationship between trade unions rather than on legislation 
(VISCOMI, 2013, 773) entails some serious difficulties in devising 
effective civil-law remedies in the event of non-compliance with 
contractual clauses. This is an important aspect and poses the question of 
finding adequate sanctions. 
The 2014 Consolidated Text entrusts collective agreements 
concluded at national and company level with the task of regulating and 
detailing the sanctioning mechanism for the “contracting parties”, 
therefore providing “monetary sanctions or other penalties involving the 
temporary suspension of the trade union rights included in the collective 
agreement and any other entitlement resulting from the present 
understanding”. However, the new procedures related to collective 
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bargaining have not been initiated so far, thus it is not possible to provide 
an assessment of the applicable sanctions.  
In any event, the remedies provided by civil law seem to have 
little effect (e.g. the objection raised regarding non-performance and 
termination clauses). They can be found in contracts laying down 
reciprocal duties, where the obligation to maintain peace on the part of 
trade unions is offset by the allocation of economic or trade union 
benefits to workers.  
Equally ineffective is the request to the Court to terminate the 
contract due to non-compliance and to award damages to the injured 
party. This is because the slow pace of the legal system would negatively 
affect the dynamism of trade unions and it would be complicated to 
ascertain and assess (GIUGNI, 1973, 24) one’s damage (DELL’OLIO, 
1990, 671 rules out the causal nexus between the strike called by the 
unions and the damage caused to the employer resulting from workers’ 
non-performance of duties. Nevertheless, relevant case law admits 
compensation for different types of damage, also indirectly caused). 
The 2014 Consolidated Text refers to pecuniary sanctions and 
envisages a penalty clause as an alternative to the award of damages. 
Nevertheless, this move does not serve as a sufficient deterrent, neither 
for the employer (individual employers or employers’ associations) nor  
for trade unions. In light of the above, providing conciliation procedures 
and establishing an arbitration board and a permanent inter-union 
committee seem to be the most effective tools to settle possible disputes.  
The failure to implement the 2014 Consolidated Text stirs up the 
debate about whether legislative action is needed in industrial relations 
(RUSCIANO, 2003, 266). This might help to protect workers falling 
outside the scope of application of the 2014 Consolidated Text and to 
ensure that rules are applied consistently in such a delicate area as the 
right to strike.   
4. Comparative analysis between Italy, Britain and 
France. 
In Britain the absence of a written Constitution, like the one at the 
base of many legal systems traditionally defined civil law, such as Italy 
and France, involved the development not so much of the recognition of a 
real right to strike, but rather the affirmation of a widespread negative 
freedom to strike. 
As is known, in fact, in common law countries, namely based on 
law pronounced by the courts through the judgments, it is possible to 
recognize the layer of legality before the parliamentary legislation 
(CORRAZZA – DI GIOVINE – FERRARI, 2013, 74). For this reason, into 
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the Anglo-Saxon judicial system, the courts have played in the 
determination of boundaries and limits to the exercise of the right to 
strike a crucial role. 
During the nineteenth century, the "Master and Servant Act" 
considered the exercise of the strike like a crime as well as cause of 
resolution of the employment contract. In addition, the Courts shared the 
same line of thought. In fact, the latter developed a system of additional 
penalties. The Trade Disputes Act of 1906 made an important 
breakthrough because it laid the foundations of the actually negative 
freedom to strike. However, the unions and the workers did not enjoy 
even a fundamental right to strike. The law, in fact for this reason, 
provides for trade unions and workers a system called "immunity", 
without which the same should answer for the crimes of termination, of 
incitement to breach of contract, of harassment and damages. Through 
the system of immunity any act performed during the announcement or 
promotion of a labor dispute, according to the so-called "golden formula 
disputes" (Monkam, 2010, 10), is covered by a status of immunity 
significant both in terms of criminal than civil responsibility. Currently the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Act of 1992 regulate the exercise of 
the freedom to strike. Even in the absence of a legal definition of a strike, 
it provides that a dispute between workers and employers gives immunity 
to workers, who would otherwise be liable to sue for damages. This 
dispute must be significantly related to problems concerning the 
workplace, in this way ruling out the legality of any form of political strike 
or solidarity. Richer in this respect appears the Employement Rights Act 
of 1996. This Act mentions most definitions of strike including "the 
cessation of work by a body of workers collectively" or "the joint refusal 
of most workers to continue working for the employer in the presence of 
a labor dispute "(BARRET - EARL - LYNCH, 2012, 92). 
The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, as later amended, 
provides for a series of procedural requirements to be respected before 
the start of the strike because industrial disputes involve high cost and 
often they are detrimental for companies and workers. In Britain, for this 
reason, the culture of negotiation is very developed. However, when this 
is not possible, the Trade Union of '92, as amended by "Employment 
Relations Acts" of 1999, disciplines a rigid and complex procedure 
characterized by a preventive "pre -strike ballots", a secret ballot held 
among workers of the factories affected by the strike. 
The violation of the procedure of pre-strike ballots involves for the 
union the loss of immunity (MAGNANI, 2013, 55). The Government also 
made a similar proposal in Italy with the presentation in the Senate of 
the bill n. 1473 of 2009, concerning the reform of the discipline of the 
20 LILLI CAROLLO, SILVIA DONÀ,  MARTA FILIPPI,  ANNA ROTA, MARIANNA RUSSO 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 125/2015 
strike in the public services. Regarding instead the conventional limits to 
the exercise of the right to strike should be noted that, although the 
British judicial system does not knows a real obligation of industrial 
peace, some collective and individual agreements can force workers not 
to strike for a period of time (ARABELLA STEWART & MARK BELL, 2012, 
102).  
In fact, the TULRCA of 1992 (the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Consolidation), provides that when a collective agreement 
contain no strike clauses, these will form part of individual’s contract of 
employment only when: 1) the collective agreement is made by an 
independent trade union and it is in writing; 2) it states that the no strike 
clause may be incorporated into contracts of employment; 3) it is 
reasonably accessible during working hours; 4) the worker’s own contract 
expressly or impliedly, incorporates it into his contract.  It is no possible 
for a collective agreement or individual contract of employment to 
contract out of the above conditions. 
In France the recognition of the right to strike and its relevance as 
a constitutional right, must be considered the result of a long and difficult 
path. Said path arrived to fruition only with the approval of the preamble 
of the Constitution of 1946, reclaimed by the next of 1958. This 
preamble, which also inspired the Italian Constitution, provides in section 
7 that "the right to strike is exercised in the context of the laws that 
regulate it." Based on the reference in the Constitution to the law, during 
the years, in contrast to what happened in Italy, the legislature 
intervened several times to regulate the right to strike both in the private 
labor sector both in the public.  
In a fragmented legal framework, the vertices by the Court of 
Cassation and the State Council have made up for the gaps left by the 
legislature, both for the scope both for the definition of the limits of the 
right to strike18. In France, the right to strike is defined as "a collective 
and concerted work stoppage in support of claims professional19" From 
this definition derives that, as in other jurisdictions such as the Italian, 
the right to strike appears as an individual right to exercise necessarily 
collective (PELLISSIER, 2008, 1406 - TEYSSIE ', 2012, 893). 
In the French system the exercise of the right to strike is limited 
mainly from legal sources, especially in the public sector (as, indeed, in 
the Italian system), while for the private sector, the Civil Code identifies 
some optional procedures for resolving conflicts at the basis of the 
                                                            
18 Cons. d'Et. 7 july 1950, Dehaene, D. 1950, 538, comment by André Gervais, G.C.P. 1950, 
II. 5681, conci. Gazier; Civ. sect, soc., 27 jenuary 1956, D. 1956, 481. 
19 Cfr. Cour de Cassation  23 october 2007, in RJS 01/08, n. 65. 
CONTRACTUAL LIMITS TO THE RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE ERA OF CRISIS. THE ITALIAN CASE 
WITH SOME COMPARATIVE RELIEFS (FRANCE AND THE U.K.) 
21 
 
WP C.S.D.L.E. "Massimo D'Antona" .INT – 125/2015 
exercise of the right to strike, such as conciliation, mediation and 
arbitration (not present in the Italian if not to establish conventionally). 
Regarding the conventional limits to the exercise of the right to 
strike, for a long time, the General Confederation of Labour, also 
supported by the Literature (SINAY - Javillier, 1984, 250), defended the 
thesis of nullity of the no strike clauses. This conclusion is based on the 
preamble of the French Constitution which poses as the only restriction 
on the exercise of this right the laws that govern it.  
Indeed as early as the 60s' that view it was widely criticized by the 
Literature and jurisprudence. The idea that the trade unions signed a 
collective labor agreement are required to not declare the strike for 
matters governed by the same collective agreement during its validity, 
(DURAND, 1961.216) according to the more general principle of good 
faith and fairness in the execution of the obligation, it begins to emerge 
in this period (DURAND, 1961.216) 
The actual labor law Literature believes that conventional clauses 
limiting the strike, understood as an individual right, it is not always 
invalid. an important ruling by the French Supreme Court has reinforced 
this concept20. The French Supreme Court, considering a negotiating 
clause requiring a period of notice in the event of a strike in the private 
sector, said not so much the illegality of the clause, but the 
ineffectiveness against individual workers, who, on strike, exercise a 
constitutional right (Cristau, 2008, 9). 
5. Brief Conclusions. 
The economic crisis, the outsourcing of production, and 
globalization have produced significant changes in industrial relations and 
trade union activity, causing a worsening of conflict and a gradual 
decrease in unionism rates among employers and employees. Against 
this background, a change is evident in the way strikes are organized, 
since workers’ traditional non-performance of work gives way to other 
collective mechanisms of self-protection (CORAZZA, 2012, 13). 
Consequently, industrial peace clauses have also been amended and 
become enforceability clauses, as laid down in the 2014 Consolidated 
Text, even though their legitimacy has been questioned by a part of legal 
opinion. 
The review of the trade union system and the close relationship 
between different economic dynamics affect industrial peace, placing the 
need to make collective agreements enforceable high on the agenda of 
trade unions. 
                                                            
20 Cass. Soc. 7 june 1995. 
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Enforceability is the mechanism identified by the social partners to 
ensure the effectiveness of collective agreements (MARESCA, 2015, 112) 
which is also supplemented with a set of sanctions put in place to avoid 
conflict. This way, protest, which in the past was the prerogative of trade 
unions, now also takes place through spontaneous strikes called by 
groups of workers, who are motivated by collective interests, irrespective 
of the union they are affiliated to. These groups cannot be sanctioned, 
since statutory penalties only apply to the contracting parties and not to 
individual workers.  
In the view of the foregoing considerations, the 2014 Consolidated 
Text seems to argue in favour of conflict resolution through arbitration 
and conciliation procedures. The trend to promote the amicable resolution 
of employment-related disputes is also evident in the other countries 
surveyed (The UK and France). In the first case, pre-strike ballots are 
organised, while in the second case a widespread use of conciliation and 
mediation mechanisms has been reported in both the public and the 
private sector. 
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